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AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL 
AUTHORITIES (DSCA) REIMBURSEMENT PROCESS 
ABSTRACT 
 This project analyzed the existing process used by Department of Defense forces 
to authorize and claim reimbursement from the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) while providing Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). Research was 
conducted on existing policies and documented DSCA procedures at each level within 
the network. This project used a process analytics approach to map a flowchart along 
with interviews conducted among key stakeholders to obtain insight into each role while 
requesting improvement recommendations. A quantitative analysis of the primary DSCA 
database also yielded an understanding of how each stakeholder interfaces the portal, 
attempting to understand the utility of such a system during one specific DSCA event. 
 The analysis resulted in the conclusion that the area of greatest weakness is found 
in the level of process knowledge at the operational level. This is believed to have created 
coordination challenges that prevented proper claim submission. This study recommends 
the creation of a standardized reference for users at the unit and FEU operational levels 
defining their role in the process and the proper procedures to be executed. This is 
believed to offer the largest benefit in the shortest period of time. 
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Since the birth of the United States, there have been repeated instances where the 
U.S. Armed Forces were called upon to assist local and state governments to confront civil 
and natural disaster-related challenges. Underlying those assistance efforts is a 
responsibility to the U.S. taxpayer to responsibly track expenditures and associated 
reimbursements. The means and methods of financial management operations throughout 
the Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission 
have continually evolved, and although these methods have improved over the course of 
our military’s history there remains a need for additional refinement. The following 
overview provides a brief background of the DSCA mission and the financial challenges 
associated with such efforts. The questions to be confronted by this analysis are established 
and the steps taken to answer these questions are presented.  
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL 
AUTHORITIES MISSION 
In July 1794, a group of 500 armed men in the newly formed State of Pennsylvania 
attacked the home of the regional tax inspector. Several years earlier, Alexander Hamilton 
pushed the first internal revenue tax through Congress in an effort to collect funds to pay 
down the debt accumulated during the American Revolution. One commodity affected by 
the tax was liquor, which was produced in large quantities in Western Pennsylvania where 
it was used as an informal currency in the region, hence the opposition to the tax. The attack 
marks the first rebellion against federal rule in the newly formed nation. President 
Washington’s response was a swift call to order of 13,000 militia troops from 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia. The opposition declined armed conflict 
and the rebellion was suppressed without the loss of life (Kotowski, n.d.). This marked the 
first time in our nation’s history in which the concept of Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities (DSCA) was used to maintain order within our nation’s borders  
Thirteen years later, Congress officially passed legislation establishing 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 331–335, also known as the Insurrection Act. This legislation formally gave the 
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President the authority to use the armed forces to suppress rebellion and insurrection, at 
the request of a state’s governor (9th U.S. Congress, 1807). This act was exercised often 
throughout the 19th century in response to rebellions, conflict with Native Americans, the 
Civil War, and urban riots. In 1887, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act, a Latin 
phrase for “force of one’s country,” in an effort to limit the scope of allowable federal 
assistance and exclude law enforcement by the military unless otherwise authorized by 
Congress (Larson & Peters, 2001). This minimized federal support to local law 
enforcement organizations. Though support to law enforcement falls within the general 
DSCA umbrella, it is outside of the scope of this analysis. 
While DSCA’s origins lie in support to law enforcement, the largest area of DSCA 
effort in recent history has been disaster relief. Whether it be via flooding, tornadoes, 
hurricanes, forest fires or earthquakes, the Department of Defense has a secondary mission 
to provide support to state governments and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) when events arise that overwhelm the emergency management capabilities of 
those organizations. To understand the DoD’s role in DSCA efforts specifically related to 
natural disasters and to understand how we have arrived at the current processes, it is once 
again beneficial to take a look at history.  
B. DISASTER RELIEF 
The first instance of federal disaster relief can be traced back to 1803 when the 7th 
Congress passed An Act for The Relief of the Sufferers by Fire, in the Town of Portsmouth 
of 1803. This statue provided federal tax relief to all those affected by the fire (7th U.S. 
Congress, 1803). For the next century, any federal disaster relief was funded on an ad hoc 
basis, requiring Congress to pass a relief bill of every disaster. The first change to this 
format was the Flood Control Act of 1934 which funded the Army Corps of Engineers to 
design and build flood control projects throughout the country. Additionally, in 1958, the 
Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization was created which facilitated federal funding and 
coordination to the hundreds of state and local Civil Defense Directors that dotted the 
nation. Catastrophic hurricane damage during the 1960s led to the creation of the federally 
organized National Flood Insurance Program in 1968. Ad hoc funding for individual 
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disaster relief continued until 1978, when President Jimmy Carter signed Executive Act 
12127, thereby creating FEMA (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017). 
The creation of the FEMA provided the solution to the previous practice of ad hoc 
funding for each disaster. Direct funding provided to this new agency, in combination with 
the provisions allowed by the Economy Act, authorized FEMA to request disaster recovery 
services from the DoD when local, state, and FEMA resource capacity was surpassed. Ten 
years after the creation of FEMA, the Stafford Act of 1988 authorized the DoD to spend 
DoD appropriations with the provision of FEMA reimbursement provided there is a 
Presidential Disaster Declaration associated with the services and goods provided (100th 
U.S. Congress, 1998). 
C. THE CURRENT CHALLENGE 
For 27 years, the processes executed by FEMA when confronting natural disasters 
were sufficient to meet the challenges presented. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 presented a 
scale of complexity never before seen by the organization. It highlighted several areas of 
weakness that FEMA and the DoD would have to confront moving forward. Financial 
management in the face of such complexity, specifically within the area of accurate 
interagency reimbursement, was seen as lacking. Steps have been taken over the past 
13 years to improve the level of accuracy within the reimbursement practices of the DoD, 
yet challenges within the current process still exist. 
A highly simplified version of the process is as follows: FEMA requests support 
and provides reimbursable budget authority to the DoD, and, if able to support, U.S. 
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) conducts staff planning and issues orders. 
Individual units provide cost estimates to validate the FEMA reimbursable authority 
amount, then execute DSCA work with their own DoD budget authority, then submit 
reimbursement requests that ultimately are paid by FEMA. While the steps above comprise 
the essential steps, the full process flow is complex and involves not just USNORTHCOM 
and units of action, but also service-level comptrollers, Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service (DFAS), U.S. Army North (ARNORTH), multiple accounting systems, and many 
intermediate steps (U.S. Northern Command [USNORTHCOM] J83, 2018). 
4 
D. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
According to the DoD’s DSCA tracking database, FEMA issued $165.3 million in 
reimbursable budget authority to the DoD during Hurricane Harvey in Fiscal Year 2017. 
The magnitude and complexity of the reimbursement process led to the research question 
of this analysis: Are all of the services provided by the DoD accurately reimbursed by 
FEMA?  Since FEMA executes all reimbursement requests received, provided the requests 
are not for more than initially authorized, this places the duty to answer this question within 
the realm of DoD’s responsibility. Furthermore, it can be noted that this initial problem 
statement can be followed by other questions of consequence. 
1. If the DoD is not executing the full reimbursable authority granted by 
FEMA for the services rendered and is instead using authority from the 
DoD budget, what are the factors leading to, and consequences of, not 
doing so and can this be calculated?   
2. If there are instances where DoD has requested more than authorized, 
what are the factors that create such a situation? 
3. What does the difference between the FEMA authorized reimbursement 
amount and the amount actually claimed represent? 
4. If the amount request is less than what should be reimbursed, can the 
shortfall be calculated during one specific hurricane event? 
5. If the amount requested is less than what is should be claimed, how might 
the process be improved? 
6. Do the unit level financial managers understand the reimbursement 
process and their role within the process? 
7. How does the non-routine nature of the DSCA funding and reimbursement 
process contribute to issues with reimbursement rates and timelines? 
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It is the intention of this study to answer the initial and follow on problem statement 
questions in an effort to assist USNORTHCOM in improving the DSCA reimbursement 
process.  
E. APPROACH 
This project analyzes the existing process used by Department of Defense forces to 
obtain reimbursement from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) while 
providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). A full review of all the 
publications, policies, and directives governing the authorization and reimbursement 
process related to the DSCA mission establishes the understanding of how the process is 
intended to flow. This project then presents a process analytics approach to map and 
identify problems within the authorization and reimbursement process. Interviews with key 
members within the process help determine the scope of their function and role in the 
process. A review of the reimbursements to the DoD from FEMA related to the Hurricane 
Harvey event within the online financial management software known as the DoD Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities Automated Support System (DDASS) is valuable in 
attempting to quantify the potential difference between what is and should be reimbursed. 
The intent of these combined efforts is to answer the problem statement questions above. 
6 
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II. BACKGROUND ON DOD SUPPORT OF FEMA 
Recent years have seen significant natural disasters in the United States, the 
response to which required DoD to provide DSCA. As the combatant command for 
homeland defense and DSCA efforts, it is USNORTHCOM’s responsibility to plan for and 
coordinate DSCA efforts in support of FEMA. The bulk of the DoD support comes in the 
form of services such as search & rescue and transportation. These services come at a cost, 
and it is the DoD’s responsibility to seek reimbursement from FEMA.  
The poor federal response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 led to multiple 
investigations, audits, and a Congressional investigation. Eight internal audits conducted 
by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), DoD Inspector General (IG), Army 
Audit Agency (AAA), Naval Audit Service (NAS) and Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) 
focused on the financial management operations of the DoD relief effort (Department of 
Defense Inspector General [DoDIG], 2008). Hurricane Katrina was not only a focusing 
event for all federal disaster relief efforts, it was also a defining moment for DSCA 
financial management operations. Prior to Hurricane Katrina the financial management 
process was not clearly defined.  
In response to IG investigative fieldwork the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer [USD(C/CFO)] published a June 2006 
memo directing the establishment of a Financial Management Augmentation Team 
(FMAT) with each military service to provide three personnel as members. The FMAT 
will “assist USNORTHCOM in testing and validating financial management processes and 
controls developed by USNORTHCOM” for support of DSCA (Jonas, 2006, p.1). 
Additionally, the FMAT will train and coordinate with USNORTHCOM for DSCA and 
complete the financial management during these events (DoDIG, 2006). 
A. HURRICANE KATRINA 
On August 23, 2005, a tropical depression developed in the southeastern Bahamas. 
This depression developed into Hurricane Katrina. On August 29, it struck Louisiana 
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approximately 45 miles southeast of New Orleans as a Category 4 hurricane (National 
Weather Service, 2016). 
At the request of Louisiana’s governor, President Bush declared a major disaster 
on August 29, 2005 (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2005). The initial 
military response was from National Guard units followed shortly by active duty personnel. 
As of September 12, 2005, over 22,000 active duty personnel and 46,000 national guard 
members were supporting relief efforts. The Navy and Coast Guard had 21 ships on station. 
Over 19 million Meals Ready to Eat (MRE), 40 million liters of water, and 140 million 
pounds of ice had been delivered to Louisiana and Mississippi (USNORTHCOM, 2005). 
Though USNORTHCOM is responsible for DSCA in the continental United States, 
the DSCA function is a secondary mission, as the DoD is a “fifth level responder” under 
the National Response Framework (NRF) (DoDIG, 2008, p 3). The massive DoD response 
to Hurricane Katrina ultimately strained USNORTHCOM’s ability to fulfill this secondary 
mission, including the financial management operations required to execute DSCA tasks. 
A 2008 DoD Inspector General (IG) report investigated the DoD’s financial 
management operations during Hurricane Katrina. The IG reviewed the tracking, approval 
process and financial management aspects of DoD disaster relief efforts specific to Katrina. 
The IG found that “DoD did not effectively manage financial operations during the 
Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.” This ineffective financial management was due to 
guidance that was out of date and conflicted, this risked surpassing “mission assignment 
dollar thresholds” established by FEMA (DoDIG 2008, p. 20). 
The 2008 IG report also revealed that the DoD did not properly track the Mission 
Assignments (MA) being issued to DoD by FEMA. MA are the primary mechanism that 
FEMA uses to request federal assistance under the NRF. They contain financial and 
administrative requirements to which responding agencies must adhere (FEMA, 2015). 
During Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, different entities, including USNORTHCOM, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), manually 
tracked MAs and amendments on different spreadsheets. The IG found that the data in none 
of the independently created and maintained spreadsheets matched any other spreadsheet; 
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neither did any entity properly account for all of the 121 MAs and amendments, valued at 
$2 billion (DoDIG, 2008). The lack of consistent information led to the development of the 
DoD DSCA Automated Support System (DDASS), a website that allows each responsible 
party to review, track and input its required information under respective mission 
assignments (USNORTHCOM J83, 2018).  
Another finding of the IG was that the initial execute orders (EXORDs) and 
subsequent modifications from USNORTHCOM did not contain the funding data and MA 
numbers necessary for tasked units to understand their reimbursable budget authority, nor 
did they properly allocate reimbursable budget authority (RBA) on a proportional basis. 
This could have caused DoD to exceed funded amounts established for the MAs (DoDIG, 
2008). These incomplete EXORDs adversely impacted the financial operations of Katrina 
relief efforts.  
Additionally, the DoD 3025 series of directives was found to be outdated. This 
series of directives “[e]stablishes policy and assigns responsibilities for DSCA,” as well as 
provides guidance for oversight and execution of DSCA events when DoD support has 
been requested (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2018). The IG report 
also identified that USNORTHCOM’s structure and oversight of the FMAT was 
problematic and that the FMAT did not have a standard method for establishing and 
recording how funds were divided between different units. The IG report also pointed out 
that USNORTHCOM should make provisions for services other than the Army to execute 
DSCA financial management operations (DoDIG, 2008). In summary, the IG concluded 
that “[p]roviding guidance for financial management of the mission assignments 
should allow DoD to improve processes for mission assignments for future disasters” 
(DoDIG, 2008). 
B. HURRICANE HARVEY 
On August 12, 2017, a tropical wave formed off the west coast of Africa. This was 
the beginning of Hurricane Harvey. Harvey was expected to make landfall as a strong 
Tropical Storm or Category 1 hurricane, hitting Texas somewhere between Brownsville 
and Houston. By the August 24, Harvey’s intensity had strengthened and was expected to 
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reach Category 3, make landfall and stall out over Texas for days. Having intensified to a 
Category 4, Harvey approached the Texas coast the evening of August 25. At 
approximately 2200 hours local time, Harvey hit San Jose Island and eventually the areas 
of Rockport and Fulton, Texas (US Department of Commerce, 2018). President Trump 
made the major disaster declaration the same evening (Diamond & Tatum, 2017) 
Storm surges, as high as 12 feet in some areas, contributed to the disaster. Historic 
rainfall significantly affected southern Texas. Major river flooding occurred on the 
Guadalupe River with many other rivers and creeks reaching their peaks as well. On August 
30 Harvey made its final strike in Cameron, Louisiana. Heavy rain and flooding continued 
throughout this final landfall (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2018). During its five-day 
onslaught, Harvey caused approximately $125 billion in damage, second only to Hurricane 
Katrina (World Vision, 2018). 
The relief effort was significant. Texas Governor Greg Abbott called up the 12,000 
available of the 19,000 total Texas National Guard troops. There were 20,000–30,000 more 
troops available from other states should the appropriate requests be made. Ten other states 
lent assistance including, California, New York, and Connecticut. Most of the federal 
government assistance came in the form of supplies or equipment. USNORTHCOM 
deployed 1,000 active duty personnel (Maucione, 2017). The Army Corps of Engineers 
rendered services for everything from sandbagging areas to dewatering flood zones and 
power restoration (Davidson, 2017). By September, more than 16,800 people had been 
rescued by federal agencies to include the United States Coast Guard, Customs and Border 
Protection and the Department of Defense (FEMA, 2017). 
As one of the most recent major hurricanes to require DSCA, Hurricane Harvey 
will be the case study for USNORTHCOM’s financial management response. The severity 
of this hurricane and two closely following hurricanes, Hurricanes Irma and Maria, 
provides an opportunity to review USNORTHCOM financial management practices and 
FMAT performance in the wake of a catastrophic event requiring DSCA. 
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III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
This chapter describes the statutes, regulations, and directives that apply to the 
reimbursement process. It is important to understand what restrictions and policies are in 
place such that current procedures may be compared to regulatory limitations, and policy 
gaps may be identified during the process analytics phase of this project. Analyzing the 
requirements outlined in existing regulations may also lead to insights about requirements 
that are not being met, or DoD-imposed requirements that are neither functionally 
necessary or required by statute. 
A. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 
The National Response Framework (NRF) is neither a statute nor a regulation, but 
is a document that provides a framework for response to disasters and other emergencies 
within the United States. It outlines responsibilities and coordination systems from the 
individual citizen level up through the federal government level. It is important to note that 
the NRF does not indicate that the DoD has any primary responsibilities for incident 
response, but instead simply points to the legal authorities available to utilize DoD assets 
after civil authority resources have been overwhelmed. As a Department of Homeland 
Security publication, the NRF is a key document that provides guidance to as to when civil 
authorities may seek DoD support but does not address how such support is funded 
(Department of Homeland Security [DHS] 2016a). 
B. CURRENT STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 
Title 32, Part 185 of the Code of Federal Regulations (32 CFR 185) identifies the 
legal authorities providing for DSCA (Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2011). There 
are two statutes that provide the legal authority for FEMA to reimburse (DoD) for costs 
incurred by the DoD in support of a FEMA mission. 
The first statute is the Economy Act of 1984, which provides the authority for 
agencies to reimburse other agencies for work (98th U.S. Congress, 1984). The Economy 
Act is a general statute, not tied to any specific function such as disaster relief, and 48 CFR 
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17.502-2 states that “The Economy Act applies when more specific statutory authority does 
not exist” (98th U.S. Congress, 1984). Relevant to the issue of FEMA-funded reimbursable 
work, this means that Economy Act orders may be issued from FEMA to the DoD in the 
absence of a formal disaster declaration. The Economy Act has been modified since its 
original issuance but the general concept of one agency purchasing from another agency 
has not changed. 
The second statute is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act of 1998 (Stafford Act), which provides specific authorities only following 
a Presidential declaration of major disaster or emergency after receiving a declaration 
request from one or more state governors. Once the declaration is made, the provisions of 
the Stafford Act apply to Federal disaster response. Key provisions of the Stafford Act are 
outlined below. 
Section 304 of the Stafford Act provides for reimbursement authority, noting that 
“Federal agencies may be reimbursed for expenditures under this Act from funds 
appropriated for the purposes of this Act,” which provides the legal framework for 
reimbursement to occur (100th U.S. Congress, 1998). 
Section 402 of the Stafford Act governs “General Response” and provides the 
President the authority to “direct any Federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to 
utilize its authorities and the resources granted to it under Federal law (including personnel, 
equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and advisory services) in support 
of State and local assistance response and recovery efforts, including precautionary 
evacuations.” (100th U.S. Congress, 1998). 
Section 403 (c) of the Stafford Act provides amplifying information as pertains only 
to “Essential Assistance,” or “assistance essential to meeting immediate threats to life and 
property resulting from a major disaster.” Under this section, the utilization of DoD 
resources for a disaster that “may ultimately qualify for assistance under this title or title V 
of this Act” is limited to ten days following a gubernatorial request to the President, and 
ensuing direction through the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for the DoD to render 
assistance” (100th U.S. Congress, 1998, p. 403a). 
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C. DOD REGULATIONS 
Implementation of DoD DSCA effort starts at the SECDEF level. 10 U.S.C. 113 
(g)(3) requires that SECDEF provides the “Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] written 
policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans, including plans for 
providing support to civil authorities in an incident of national significance or a 
catastrophic incident” (115th U.S. Congress, 2017). DoD regulations implementing 
authorities stemming from U.S. Codes are recorded in the CFR, and are promulgated in 
Directives and Instructions. CFR and Directive sections relevant to the DSCA 
reimbursement process are discussed here. 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) publishes DoD Directive 
3025.18, which broadcasts the policies and responsibilities outlined in 32 CFR 185 in a 
directive format to the DoD. Key provisions of 32 CFR 185 are discussed below. 
32 CFR 185.4—Policy makes explicit the requirement for reimbursement to the 
DoD for DSCA work, stating “All requests for DSCA shall be written, and shall include a 
commitment to reimburse the Department of Defense in accordance with the Stafford Act, 
Economy Act, or other authorities except requests for support for immediate response, and 
mutual or automatic aid” and further clarifies that all actions should be done on a 
reimbursable basis (Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2011). Of note, this is more 
stringent than the Stafford Act in requiring reimbursement for DoD support to FEMA. 
32 CFR 185.5—Responsibilities further defines duties within the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), laying out specific tasks within the DoD for managing the 
DSCA reimbursement process as follows. 
“The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 
shall…Establish policies and procedures to ensure timely reimbursement to the 
Department of Defense for reimbursable DSCA activities.” This requires a DoD-wide 
procedure for reimbursement management, and rules are codified in the Financial 
Management Regulations (FMR), which is discussed further in the next section.  
“The Heads of DoD Components shall…direct Component compliance with 
financial management guidance related to support provided for DSCA operations, 
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including guidance related to tracking costs and seeking reimbursement.” As each 
service processes financial transactions differently, each Component must prepare more 
specific reimbursement guidance than might come from the SECDEF level. 
“The Secretaries of the Military Departments…shall…direct that requests for 
reimbursement of actual DSCA expenditures (performance of work or services, payments 
to contractors, or delivery from inventory) begin within 30 calendar days after the month 
in which performance occurred. Final billing invoices shall be submitted…within 
90 calendar days of the termination of the supported event.” 
“The Commanders of Combatant Commands with DSCA responsibilities… 
shall…work closely with subordinate commands to ensure that they are appropriately 
reimbursed for DSCA.”  USNORTHCOM provides reimbursement assistance, produces a 
procedural handbook and leads a Financial Management Augment Team (FMAT) for its 
Area of Responsibility (AOR) (Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2011). 
D. FUNCTIONAL REGULATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE 
The DoD issues regulations that provide implementation guidance beyond what is 
found in the CFR and departmental directives. The Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) issues Volume 11A, chapter 19 of the FMR to establish “financial policy for 
identifying, recording, reporting, and obtaining reimbursement for costs the Department of 
Defense (DoD) incurs in its role of providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
(DSCA)” (Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) [USD(C)]), 2015, p. 4). The chapter 
provides an overview of DSCA responsibilities and statutory authorities, provides 
accounting guidance, and defines terms used within DSCA operation. Volume 11A, 
chapter 19 also outlines responsibilities for DSCA as pertaining to financial management 
within the DoD and outlines the generic process for reimbursement. Of particular note, the 
FMR also introduces the Financial Management Augment Team (FMAT) concept, 
establishing the need for a multi-command financial team to handle the DSCA 
reimbursement process (USD(C), 2015). 
The DoD does outline key responsibilities of the Defense Coordinating Officer 
(DCO) in Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3025.23, Defense Liaison with Civil 
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Authorities. Of key importance to financial management processes, this instruction assigns 
the following tasks to the DCO: 
• Maintaining MA records using DDASS, including estimated and actual 
costs, 
• Facilitation of MA closeouts, to include coordination with DoD 
components, 
• Coordination with FM entities of Combatant Commanders to both 
facilitate and report on the status of reimbursement (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD(P)], 2016a). 
The DoD also issues a series of manuals providing further guidance in the 
implementation of directives and regulations. DoD Manual (DoDM) 3025.01, Volume 2, 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities: Incident Response, provides guidance categorized 
by incident type and provides brief synopses for authorities, responsibilities, and processes 
for various types of DSCA response events. Of note, this manual provides an explanation 
of the mechanism and process through which FEMA requests DoD support—the Mission 
Assignment (MA) (OUSD(P), 2016b). The manual, however, does not delve into specifics 
with regard to the process of reimbursement for DSCA work. 
E. MULTI-SERVICE DOCTRINAL PUBLICATIONS AND STANDARD 
OPERATING PROCEDURES 
The Joint Staff issues doctrinal publications called Joint Publications to establish 
and promulgate “overarching guidelines and principals” that are common across service 
lines (Joint Staff, 2013, p. i). Joint Publication (JP) 3–28, Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities, is the doctrinal publication for DSCA support. It provides background on the 
NRF, reimbursement authorities, command and control structures, and references DoDD 
3025.18 extensively. Of particular note, JP 3–28 contains an appendix devoted to 
reimbursement, in which reimbursable and non-reimbursable cost types are identified 
(Joint Staff, 2013). JP 1–06, Financial Management Support to Joint Operations, contains 
limited information about the reimbursement process but recognizes USNORTHCOM’s 
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ability to manage a DSCA reimbursement process and stand up Financial Management 
Augment Teams (Joint Staff, 2016). 
USNORTHCOM issues its own Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), the 
Financial Management Augment Team (FMAT) Handbook. This document is an SOP that 
provides substantially more detail about the reimbursement process than does the FMR or 
other DoD publications. It includes more detailed process flowcharts than the FMR, 
explicitly listing each step in the reimbursement process, and explicitly tying actions within 
the process to specific entities. The document has been updated several times in calendar 
year 2018, with a goal of issuing the document as a signed USNORTHCOM J8 publication 
in calendar year 2019 (USNORTHCOM J83, 2018). 
F. SERVICE LEVEL REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE 
Each service implements financial management processes differently, due to 
different organizational structures and accounting systems. 
Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10–8 requires that the “Assistant Secretary of 
the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller (SAF/FM) will publish policy  
and guidance  pertaining  to  reimbursement  and  accountability of Air Force, Air National 
Guard and Air Force Reserve Command appropriations expended in DSCA planning 
thru response phases of operations” (Secretary of the Air Force [SECAF], 2012, p. 4). AFI 
10–801 is the implementing instruction for AFPD 10–8 and provides additional details 
about FEMA requests for support and what types of responses incur reimbursement. It then 
points financial managers to AFI 65–601, Volume 1 Budget Guidance and Procedures, for 
instructions on tracking funds and submitting reimbursement requests (SECAF, 2015a). 
Air Force Instruction (AFI) 65–601, Volume 1, provides minimal expansion of 
reimbursement processes put but directs readers to Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 65–605, 
Volume 1 for further details (SECAF, 2018). AFMAN 65–605, Volume 1 is the SAF/FM’s 
guidance provided to meet the requirement of AFPD 10–8, and does provide guidance on 
tracking funds and who is responsible for reimbursement requests (SECAF, 2015b). 
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The Army issues Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3–28 Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities to lay a basic groundwork for the concept of DSCA operations (Department of 
the Army [DoA], 2012). Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3–28 Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities is published to further expound upon ADP 3–28 and provide 
more specific information. Of note, it stresses the requirement for each unit of action to 
track and submit costs for reimbursement (DoA, 2013). 
The Navy publishes the Navy Financial Management Policy Manual (FMPM) that 
describes generic reimbursable funding procedures, but does not specifically address 
DSCA processes. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) issues OPNAV Instruction 
(OPNAVINST) 5440.77b, Missions, Functions, And Tasks of United States Fleet Forces 
Command, to delegate DSCA planning within the continental United States to Fleet Forces 
Command (FFC), which also functions as USNORTHCOM’s Navy service component 
(Navy North, or NAVNORTH) (Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], 2012). The CNO also 
publishes OPNAVINST 3440.16E, Navy Defense Support of Civil Authorities Program, 
which only provides cost reimbursement guidance that directs reimbursement but does not 
provide process information (CNO, 2016).  
The Marine Corps issues Marine Corps Order (MCO) 7300.21B, Marine Corps 
Financial Management Standard Operating Procedure Manual, which provides detailed 
instructions for reimbursable funding and cost tracking procedures but does not specifically 
address DSCA efforts (Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2015). 
G. MILITARY PLANS AND ORDERS  
Per the Unified Command Plan, USNORTHCOM’s AOR consists of the 
continental United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Alaska, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is the only other 
geographic Combatant Command with DSCA responsibility, covering Hawaii and U.S. 
Territories and insular areas in the Pacific region (USD(C), 2015). 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff publishes a standing Execute Order (EXORD) to Service 
Secretaries, USINDOPACOM, USNORTHCOM, and functional combatant commands 
directing the preparation for DSCA activities. The order gives the geographic combatant 
18 
commanders limited latitude to authorize certain DSCA activities, directs reimbursement 
for DSCA work, and outlines the process for force requests (Joint Staff J3, 2018). 
USNORTHCOM issues a standing Operations Order (OPORD) that delineates 
phases of the operation and provides a command and control (C2) construct for DSCA 
efforts within the continental United States. This order also provides direction for cost 
tracking and reimbursement, though it defers to service-specific guidance for methods of 
doing so. Upon the occurrence of a disaster, USNORTHCOM issues additional 
Fragmentary Orders (FRAGORDs) to task the service components with specific relief 
functions (USNORTHCOM J3, 2017). 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
This analysis employs both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The 
qualitative methods included a review of the existing publications and directives defining 
the process in addition to the analysis of databases and spreadsheets used for tracking 
purposes. Specifically, the database associated with Hurricane Harvey, DDASS, was used 
as a case study to select an individual large-scale event for deeper understanding. The 
qualitative methods used focused on individual interviews guided by process specific 
questions. A combination of these two research methods yielded an understanding of the 
process and in turn provided insight and observations into which areas pose challenges 
worth confronting, as described in the following analysis chapter. This chapter explains the 
process as established by a review of the policy and directives followed by the quantitative 
database driven case study of Hurricane Harvey. It ends with a description of the interviews 
conducted providing our baseline understanding in preparation for the observations 
and analysis. 
A. PARTICIPANTS 
To understand the reimbursement process, it is important to first have a base 
knowledge of the key players and their roles in this process. The following is a description 
of each of these players including state governments, FEMA, the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), USNORTHCOM, the FMAT, the DCO, the Defense 
Coordinating Element (DCE), the service component comptrollers, and the individually 
tasked units. 
State Governments—State governments provide the initial support to public safety 
when a natural disaster strikes. Governors have the ability to activate state National Guard 
units to assist during disaster events. When the resources available to the state 
governments, such as during a large hurricane event, are overcome the state Governor then 
requests federal assistance (DHS, 2016a). 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—When a state governor 
requests assistance, it requires either a presidential emergency or major disaster declaration 
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for FEMA to act unless a declaration is believed to be imminent. The emergency 
declaration (EM) is more limited and can be announced to provide assistance before an 
event takes place but a major disaster declaration (DR) can only be announced after a 
disaster has occurred as it authorizes much more support. This request is routed through a 
FEMA regional office and the FEMA administrator before arriving before the President. 
Once the President makes a declaration, FEMA then has the authorization to coordinate a 
full federal response during a large-scale event. FEMA is broken up into 10 regional zones, 
as seen in Figure 1 (DHS, 2016a). 
 
Figure 1. FEMA Regional Zones. Source: Department of 
Homeland Security (2016a). 
Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)—There is one DCO for each FEMA region 
shown in Figure 1. Generally, this is an O-6 grade officer who is familiar with the Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission and DoD capabilities. This person works 
closely with the FEMA regional office determining what services can be provided by the 
DoD to support the federal response. Since support normally closely relates to the Army 
Corps of Engineers and/or the National Guard, an Army officer’s experience provides the 
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most value to the regional office. The DCO is also responsible for the oversight and 
tracking of all operational aspects of the MAs, discussed further below (OUSD(P), 2016a). 
Defense Coordinating Element (DCE)—This is a multi-service team of DoD 
specialists who assist the DCO in coordinating with the FEMA regional office. They 
provide cost estimation and feasibility analysis for requests for assistance but are not 
permanently attached to the regional field office. With specific regards to financial 
management, they provide capability specific pricing information to the DCO for 
coordination with the regional office (OUSD(P), 2016a). 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller (OUSD(C))—OUSD(C) 
provides the cost tracking guidance to the service comptrollers for a specific event. This 
office is responsible for the policy oversight of the service comptrollers but remains outside 
of the actual accounting process (USNORTHCOM J83, 2018). 
United States Northern Command J3 (J3)—The operations directorate for 
USNORTHCOM issues orders to applicable services whose capabilities satisfy the 
requirements of the MAs. These orders provide the funding instructions needed for 
individual units to request reimbursement (USNORTHCOM J83, 2018).       
United States Northern Command J83 (J83)—J83 ensures that claims against an 
MA do not exceed the funding authorized on the MA, serving as the approval authority for 
issuance of RBA by service component comptrollers. Though J83 remains outside of the 
funding flow, they track all RBA associated with an event to ensure the proper execution 
of financial management associated with the reimbursement process (USNORTHCOM 
J83, 2018). 
Service Component Comptrollers (SCCs)—The SCCs are responsible for the 
issuance of RBA to the individual units or funding end users. They are responsible for 
coordinating with J83 the oversight of all RBA issued and claimed by their service. These 
comptrollers also issue service specific special purpose codes (SPCs) that are used by the 
individual units to track costs during mission execution (USNORTHCOM J83, 2018).  
Financial Management Augmentation Team (FMAT)—The FMAT is comprised 
of stakeholders at various levels within the reimbursement process. This includes 
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specialists from USNORTHCOM, the SCCs, the Defense Financial Accounting Service 
(DFAS), the OUSD(C), and the J8 directorate at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Together, this 
team comprises the subject matter expertise necessary to coordinate, advise, and manage 
RBA and claims. This team also pools recommendations for future changes to 
reimbursement policy. USNORTHCOM FMAT members may deploy to provide hands on 
management assistance during DSCA events (USNORTHCOM J83, 2018).  
Units/Financial End Users (FEUs)—Units/Financial End Users (FEUs)—The 
term is divided between unit and financial end users because not all units have financial 
managers with the ability to process DSCA claims. For example, the financial manager 
on an amphibious ship deploying in support of a hurricane event has no involvement 
in the reimbursement process. The comptroller at the ship’s Type Commander (TYCOM) 
handles all of these duties. In other services the unit is the FEU (conference). In either 
case, these units/FEUs are charged with the submission of cost estimates to the service 
level comptrollers, the receipt of RBA once issued, the submission of cost reports as 
missions are completed and finally the submission of a reimbursement claim 
(USNORTHCOM J83, 2018). 
B. DOCUMENTS AND DATABASES  
In addition to the key players, there are a number of documents, portals and codes 
that must be introduced before the actual steps of the process are defined. 
Mission Assignment—A Mission Assignment, shown as Figure 2, is a document 
issued by a FEMA regional office that requests services or support from another federal 
agency when they cannot meet these needs at a lower level. These MAs contain funding 
limitations, a description of the task/capability needed, and the timeframe desired (DHS, 
2016b). This document provides the reimbursable budget authority (RBA) allowing the 
DoD to provide the requested services on a reimbursable basis. RBA is issued to the DoD 
but the MA does not provide obligation authority to any specific unit. SCCs issue DSCA 
Reimbursable Authority Documents (DRADs), discussed in detail later in this section, that 
allocate obligation authority to specific units. 
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Figure 2. Mission Assignment. Source: Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (n.d.) 
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DoD DSCA Automated Support System (DDASS)—DDASS is an online database 
used by the DCO/E to manage MAs after they are issued from the FEMA regional office. 
Although the DCO is the primary user, this portal is used by members of the FMAT for 
situational awareness on which MAs have been issued and the amount of RBA issued 
against each MA. Additionally, the service comptrollers use the financial module within 
DDASS 
DSCA Reimbursable Authority Document (DRAD)—A DRAD, shown as Figure 
3, is issued by the service comptrollers to a unit/FEU to formally authorize the future claim 
of funds spent in support of DSCA (USNORTHCOM J83, 2018). It is important to note 
that the dollar value of all the DRADs associated with a specific MA must never exceed 
the ceiling authorized on the MA.  
MA Tracker—The MA tracker is a spreadsheet used by the FMAT members, 
primarily within USNORTHCOM, to track the funding ceilings authorized by the MAs, 
and all claims against them. This manual spreadsheet is referenced each time a service level 
comptroller requests RBA issuance approval or modification to an individual 
unit (USNORTHCOM J83, 2018). The MA tracker contains additional data that DDASS 
will not retain if an MA is canceled or modified. It provides the authors within 
USNORTHCOM J83 additional tracking capabilities to fill in where DDASS’s 
programming cannot. This process will become clearer below (USNORTHCOM J7, 2018). 
Special Purpose Codes (SPCs)—SPCs are used by individual units/FEUs to codify 
individual expenditures in an effort to link them to a specific DSCA event. The initial 
direction to commence using SPCs begins with OUSD(C) but then is tailored for each 
specific service by a unit’s/FEU’s respective service component comptrollers 
(USNORTHCOM J83, 2018). 
Operational & Fragmentary Orders (OPORDs & FRAGOs)—OPORDs & 
FRAGOs are released by USNORTHCOM to address the needs of DSCA. An OPORD is 
an overarching document that provides the overall framework for a DSCA response when 
executed by DoD forces in North America. This is not issued for each event but rather as 
a standing document for reference at any time. FRAGOs provide specific capability 
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guidance for the services to address the needs of an outstanding MA. J83 ensures that 
funding language is provided in each of these orders directing individual units to consult 
directly with their service component comptrollers for financial instruction 
(USNORTHCOM J83, 2018). 
 
Figure 3. DSCA Reimbursable Authority Document. 
Source: USNORTHCOM J83 (2018). 
Annex A—The Annex A is a spreadsheet added as an appendix to a 
USNORTHCOM issued FRAGO. It contains the MA doc number, the applicable service 
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and unit, the assignment start and stop date, and the capability requested. It is often 
referenced by J83 to provide situational awareness on what units are assigned to a given 
MA (USNORTHCOM J7, 2018). 
C. PROCESS MAPPING AND HURRICANE HARVEY DATA ANALYSIS 
To address questions 1–4 of the problem statement, the project focused on the 
FMAT handbook to build multi-organization flowcharts depicting the authorization and 
claim processes. These were built to understand each step in the process while providing a 
clear visual separation between the roles of each organization. 
As DDASS is the program of record for DSCA efforts, it was also important to 
examine the data that can be extracted from this database. This helped us determine 
whether the difference between the amount authorized and claimed could be calculated. It 
also provided the researchers a fundamental understanding of how the stakeholders within 
the process interact with the primary database.  
D. INTERVIEWS 
Interviews were conducted with key financial management personnel involved in 
the reimbursement process within the DoD. A full list of all key players was provided 
during the VISTA CAPITAL Table Top Exercise held in Colorado Springs, CO, from 
November 28–29, 2018. Representatives from each service component and from the 
combatant commander were present. At the exercise, participants walked through process 
familiarization, a walk-through of the authorization portion of the overall reimbursement 
process, and reviewed an upcoming training scenario. Individuals were selected by the 
research team based on their involvement and understanding of the process. It was essential 
to include members of the combatant commander, component services and the Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to fully understand each role and their 
interaction with other roles in the process. Interviews were conducted over the phone and 
a written record of the responses was retained by the research team. In some cases, key 
forms associated with the process were referenced during the interviews that were 
requested by the research team for review.  
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Each of the questions posed focused on answering questions 5–7 of the problem 
statement focusing on the qualitative assessment of how clear the process is to the 
participants. The questions also helped the researchers in understanding where the process 
could be improved from the perspective of the stakeholder. The questions posed were as 
follows: 
1. Please describe the process in which reimbursable authority (RBA) is 
granted. This question helped to establish whether all participants share a common 
understanding of the process by which RBA is granted and allocated. 
2. Please describe the RBA claim process. This question helped to establish 
whether all participants share a common understanding of the process by which RBA is 
claimed and reimbursed. 
3. Please describe the role of the person who grants the RBA. This question 
helped understanding of how the RBA grantors operate, as each service has a different 
process to grant RBA.  
4. Please describe the role of the person responsible for the RBA claim process. 
This question improved understanding of how the different services process reimbursement 
claims from the unit level up. 
5. Are there any steps in the process that are difficult to understand and/or 
execute? Please explain. This question provided the opportunity for stakeholders in the 
process to identify specific challenges and complexities. 
6. Please explain what personnel are involved in completion of the granting of 
RBA and/or the claiming of RBA. This question helped to identify at what level each 
service processes RBA. 
7. What resources are lacking that would facilitate a smoother FEMA funded 
disaster relief process? This question provided stakeholders the opportunity to identify 
missing resources or steps in the process. 
8. What problems exist in the process? This open-ended question allowed for a 
broad range of feedback as to what, if any, issues existed in the overall RBA process. 
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9. If a problem exists, what are the impacts resulting from these problems? 
This question allowed respondents to identify operational or other impacts coming from 
process problems. 
10. What governing directives are reference in execution of these processes? 
This question both pointed the research team to resources and also helped in understanding 
what directives were useful to process participants. 
11. Are these processes effective? This open-ended question allowed for a broad 
range of feedback as to what, if any, issues existed in the overall RBA process. 
12. Is there room for improvement in the RBA granting/claiming process? This 
question gave participants the opportunity to identify areas for improvement. 
Upon completion of the interviews, the responses were analyzed in conjunction 
with the policy and database review to provide a clearer picture of the process and 
challenge areas. Information from the interviews will be kept for six months in electronic 
format. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The combination of the quantitative policy and data review along with the 
qualitative interviews demonstrate the complexity of this process. There is no single 
reference that defines each step, so it was imperative to piece together everyone’s role to 
see the entire picture. The framework established deviates in some ways from the actual 
process and it is the intent of this study to help the theoretical align with the actual. Those 
deviations will be explored further in Chapter V to determine whether all the recovery 




This chapter reviews the process analysis and interview results gained through this 
study. These data elements aided understanding of where problems lie within the existing 
process. This chapter then examines data for Hurricane Harvey found in DDASS under the 
Mission Assignment Manager and Reimbursable Manager tools. This data provides insight 
as to the utility of DDASS itself and the success level of reimbursement tracking, 
execution, and closeout. Analysis of the data builds understanding of the factors that create 
closeout issues. 
A. DSCA REIMBURSEMENT AUTHORIZATION PROCESS 
To better understand the interaction between the multiple organizations within the 
DSCA reimbursement process, the study used the guidance from the FMAT manual and 
from several interviews to produce the flow chart in Figure 4. The following section 
explains the individual steps as visualized in the flow chart. 
Before or after a hurricane strikes a region or a state, the state Governor(s) 
responsible can request that the President declares either an emergency (EM) or major 
disaster (DR) after the damage has occurred. The key pieces to understand with each of 
these declarations is that an EM declaration can be declared before the emergency actually 
happens but provides very limited funding, while a DR is always after the destruction has 
occurred providing significantly more resources (Department of Homeland Security, 
2016a). After a state Governor makes their request, it is routed through FEMA before 
arriving on the President’s desk. If the disaster has already occurred, FEMA will likely 
have already gone to work providing some sort of federal assistance/coordination by using 
a surge (SU) MA. The SU/MA is intended to fund operations from 7–10 days when there 
is an expectation that a Presidential EM or DR declaration is forthcoming. Once the 
President declares an EM or DR in the event of a large hurricane, all funding switches over 
to a new MA. For example, the MA code could go from XXXXSU-TX for a surge response 
in Texas to XXXXEM-TX in the case of an EM declaration or to XXXXDR-TX for a 
Texas major disaster declaration (C. Wagner, email to author, January 17, 2019). 
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Figure 4. Reimbursement Authorization Process 
When FEMA requires assistance from the DoD, the FEMA regional office with the 
embedded DCO will review the capabilities being requested by a State Government. The 
DCE provides cost estimates for the capabilities being requested based on historical DSCA 
data. Once the capabilities have been initially reviewed and the cost estimates have been 
provided, the request will then turn into a MA and the DCE will enter the line items of the 
form into DDASS. The MA is coded in such a way that it could change again in the case 
of SU funding or remain the same in the case of DR funding for the reasons previously 
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described. Once the MA has been uploaded into DDASS it goes through a validation 
process that allows additional stakeholder input.  
When the MA validation process is complete in DDASS, the operations directorate 
(J3) at USNORTHCOM then provides an approval determination before entering the data 
into their tracker, the Annex A. The J3 utilizes the Annex A spreadsheet as an augment to 
DDASS in a format where they can control the tracking of issued MAs and the associated 
data provided in their FRAGORDs. All the data in the Annex A is manually entered by the 
personnel in the J3 directorate. Simultaneously, the J83 directorate, the financial managers 
within USNORTHCOM, generate reimbursement instructions for inclusion into the 
FRAGOs being written by the J3. At this time the MA tracker, the spreadsheet previously 
described to maintain awareness regarding funding ceilings and RBA approval, is updated 
by J83 to start the oversight for the latest MA. This manual updating process includes data 
directly from DDASS along with data previously manually entered into the Annex A 
(USNORTHCOM J83, 2018). 
Upon receiving the funding instructions from J83 and the completion of their orders 
writing process, J3 releases the FRAGOs prompting the services to write lower tier orders 
containing more specific instructions to their units. The SCCs then have a role to play in 
this layer of the orders dissemination process by providing further funding instructions to 
the unit/FEU. These instructions specifically include the issuance of an SPC that is 
generated by the SCC as previously instructed by OUSD(C). This SPC is generated 
specifically for each service to maintain cost tracking within a unit/FEU’s accounting 
(USNORTHCOM J83, 2018).  
In a perfect world, all of the previously describe actions would take place before a 
unit begins making expenditures related to DSCA support. Since a hurricane does not pause 
to ensure the funding instructions have been issued via the orders dissemination process, 
many units mobilize in advance of receiving the cost tracking instructions.  
Once the units receive the funding instructions from their respective services, they 
begin tracking their costs and submit cost estimates to the service level comptrollers for 
the services and goods provided for the specific period of time established in the initial MA 
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(USNORTHCOM J83, 2018). The service comptroller then takes those cost estimates and 
forwards them to USNORTHCOM for approval or if a discrepancy is found, they can 
request the unit resubmit. USNORTHCOM then reviews the estimates comparing the 
amount to the funding ceiling authorized on the MA. The major point of concern here is to 
ensure there are no Anti-Deficiency Act violations that claim more reimbursement than 
initially authorized by FEMA. If the cost estimate surpasses that which was authorized on 
the MA, J83 can request the MA be modified to include a higher ceiling. Along with this 
modification would come additional manual data entries subject to error. If J83 approves 
the cost estimate submitted, they notify the SCC and make a manual RBA approval entry 
in the MA tracker (USNORTHCOM J83, 2018).  
Once the SCC receives the approval, the next step is to issue RBA via the creation 
of a DRAD. This document is generated by the SCC to provide authorization to the 
unit/FEU to submit reimbursement claims against a specific MA. Once the DRAD is 
generated, the service comptroller also has the duty of entering the information contained 
on the document into DDASS. Once DDASS has been updated by the SCCs, the MA 
tracker and DDASS will match. If it is discovered that they do not match the FM personnel 
in J83 begin to investigate the reason. The unit then continues the mission while tracking 
their costs until their mission is complete and they are ready to submit a claim for 
reimbursement.  
B. REIMBURSEMENT CLAIM PROCESS 
Figure 5 shows each step in submitting a claim. Once a unit has completed a specific 
mission, the first step in the claim process is their submission of cost reports to the SCC. 
The comptroller then compares these cost reports to the RBA provided in the DRAD to 
ensure that the amount claimed does not exceed the amount authorized. The SCC will then 
modify the issued DRAD to reflect only the amount being claimed. OUSD(C) and J83 
receive notification of the cost report and DRAD modification. J83 then enters the new 
amount of the DRAD into the MA tracker and DDASS to maintain oversight of the 
potential claims against an MA and ensure reconciliation between the two tracking tools 
(USNORTHCOM J83, 2018).  
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Figure 5. Reimbursement Claim Flowchart 
 Once the service component comptroller modifies the DRAD to reflect the 
cost report submitted by a unit, the unit then can submit their reimbursement documents to 
DFAS for the final step of processing the claim. This process can vary by services and will 
be explained specifically for each service here. 
C. SERVICE SPECIFIC RBA PROCESSES 
The general RBA process is described in figures 4 and 5. However, each service 
has certain differences in how the process is completed. The following paragraphs shed 
light on the similarities and differences between the services. For instance, all services have 
to fill out the same claim forms to submit to FEMA for reimbursement. In addition to a 
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copy of the DRAD and MA the required forms are the DoD billing template, FEMA 
Form116-0-2 and Standard Form -1080. The major difference between the services are at 
which level this claim package is prepared and submitted. 
1. Navy RBA Process 
The RBA process for the Navy begins at NAVNORTH/U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command, the acting SCC for the Navy in this process. The NAVNORTH DSCA lead 
monitors the daily USNORTHCOM operations sync tele-conference, the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) operation/intelligence brief and communicates with U.S. Fleet Forces 
financial management office for situational awareness. This monitoring alerts 
NAVNORTH of units deployed or preparing to deploy in response to an event. 
a. Issuance 
After a unit has deployed or received prepare to deploy orders NAVNORTH 
reviews DDASS to find the corresponding MA for the event. Once an MA has been 
promulgated NAVNORTH sends the RBA cost estimate worksheet to the appropriate Type 
Commander (TYCOM); Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic (SURFLANT), 
Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic (AIRLANT) or Navy Expeditionary Combat 
Command (NECC). The TYCOM will complete the cost estimate and return it to 
NAVNORTH. This estimate is forwarded to USNORTHCOM for approval. Once 
approved, NAVNORTH will create the DRAD and forward it to the comptroller at the 
appropriate TYCOM. Costs will then be monitored. In the event that additional RBA is 
necessary the process begins again with another RBA request (W. Maurer, email to author, 
January 16, 2019). 
b. Claim 
After the operational unit completes the assigned service requirement the 
responsible TYCOM fills out the necessary paperwork to claim reimbursement. This 
package will be reviewed at the TYCOM level for completeness and accuracy. The 
TYCOM will forward the package to FMAT personnel at NAVNORTH. It will again be 
reviewed for completeness, accuracy and if the claim is appropriate and substantiated. A 
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substantiated package will be forwarded to FEMA for billing. If approved by FEMA, 
DFAS will pay the claim and reimburse the TYCOM (W. Maurer, email to author, January 
16, 2019). 
c. TYCOM 
Under the Navy framework the TYCOM carries out most of the practical financial 
duties associated with DSCA, the estimates and claim processes. After receiving tasking 
from NAVNORTH the TYCOM will find out which units have received or may receive 
prepare to deploy orders (PTDO) in support of the DSCA event. The TYCOM will 
complete the Reimbursable Authority Estimate (RAE) for the requested service(s) and 
submit to NAVNORTH and wait for a DRAD. Once the DRAD is received the TYCOM 
is free to make claims against it. The Navy FEU will be contacted by the respective 
TYCOM Financial Management Analyst (FMA) and given a cost template workbook to 
capture the specific costs associated with the DSCA work provided by the unit. This 
template is submitted to the FMA daily during an event. In turn the FMA will report to the 
NAVNORTH lead for a prescribed time period. Upon completion of an event the TYCOM 
completes and submits the reimbursement package and forwards it to NAVNORTH for 
review and submission to FEMA for reimbursement (A. Courtney, personal 
communication, January 28, 2019). 
2. Army RBA Process 
The RBA process for the Army begins at ARNORTH.  ARNORTH G8 is the Army 
SCC tasked with DSCA financial reporting responsibilities, but the financial management 
processes associated with DSCA work are pushed down to the actual unit completing the 
work. Once an Army unit is tasked with an MA and requests RBA the unit will receive 
guidance from an ARNORTH FMAT member on the process (K. Devlin, email to author, 
January 28, 2019).  
a. Issuance 
Upon confirmation of assignment, the unit completes the RBA cost estimate and 
submits it to ARNORTH. The estimate is forwarded to USNORTHCOM for approval. 
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After approval ARNORTH issues the DRAD providing RBA to the unit. Along with the 
DRAD, ARNORTH provides the SPCs that are to be used for tracking/execution purposes. 
An instruction packet which includes the MA and all the templates necessary to assist the 
unit in the execution of RBA is also provided. The unit establishes a special reimbursable 
account within its financial management system that displays the amount of RBA that has 
been allocated to the unit. The account is generally established as a Reimbursable Sales 
Order (RSO). The unit also requests Funding Reimbursable Authority (FRA) from its 
higher headquarters. Within the Army this is the authority to receive funding from an 
outside agency, the DRAD in a DSCA event. After the DRAD is issued the tasked unit 
and ARNORTH will only have interaction if there is a requirement to change the RBA, an 
increase or decrease. From this point the financial management is the responsibility of 
the unit. The unit may report status to higher headquarters but there is no requirement to 
report to ARNORTH until a claim is paid in full (L. Haley, personal communication, 
February 1, 2019). 
b. Claim 
The unit tracks and compiles costs and is responsible for the claim to FEMA. After 
completing the DSCA work the unit will complete the billing packet submit to both 
DFAS and FEMA simultaneously. Once the unit has received complete reimbursement 
(the unit may make incremental claims or wait until all work is complete) it is required 
to alert ARNORTH so that the FMAT member can close out the MA with FEMA. The 
ARNORTH FMAT member will require a screen shot from the financial management 
system as documentation the claim has been paid in full (K. Devlin, email to author, 
January 28, 2019). 
3. Marine RBA Process 
The RBA process for the Marine Corps begins when an MA is issued to Marine 
Forces Command (MARFORCOM). As the force provider MARFORCOM determines 
where to source the requested capability(s) and issues a tasking order to assign a unit, to 
provide the requested support. The funding instructions required to carry out the DSCA 
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work will be provided by MARFORCOM G-8 (A. Harrison, email to author, February 8, 
2019). 
a. Issuance 
After receiving a tasking order, the FEU fills out the RBA cost estimate worksheet 
and forwards it to Headquarters Marine Corps, Programs and Resources (HQMC P&R). 
The cost estimate is then forwarded to USNORTHCOM for review and approval. Upon 
USNORTHCOM approval HQMC P&R creates the DRAD and issues it to the FEU via 
the unit’s chain of command. Once received the FEU establishes a Reimbursable Order 
Number (RON) in its financial management system citing the appropriate fiscal 
information from the DRAD and tracks costs associated with DSCA work (A. Harrison, 
email to author, February 8, 2019). 
b. Claim 
Repeated attempts to reach a U.S. Marine Corps subject matter expert for the DSCA 
claim process were unsuccessful. Based on the 100% closure rate of Hurricane Harvey  
DRADs for which the Marine Corps was responsible it may be presumed that a claim 
process is in place. 
4. Air Force RBA Process 
The RBA process for the Air Force involves begins at the Secretary of the Air 
Force, Financial Manager (SAFFM) and involves Air Force SCCs and the actual units that 
perform the requested service. 
a. Issuance 
Upon receiving an MA, the assigned unit will complete the RBA cost estimate 
worksheet and submit it to SAFFM. The cost estimate will be reviewed, validated then 
forwarded to USNORTHCOM for further review and validation. Once validated 
USNORTHCOM J83 will approve the cost estimate and return it to the SAFFM. SAFFM 
will then issue the DRAD to the unit along with the appropriate SPC. The unit’s SCC will 
load the RBA and SPCs into the Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System 
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(DEAMS). The unit is then able to build a contract within DEAMS that allows the unit to 
create billing events which are the instances of RBA execution. The unit may now execute 
the mission making claims against the RBA (K. Jackey, personal communication, March 
4, 2019). 
b. Claim 
The Resource Advisor (RA), the unit’s financial manager, tracks and compiles 
costs, and is responsible for the claim to FEMA. After the unit completes the DSCA work, 
the RA completes the billing event in DEAMS and the FEMA billing packet. DFAS is 
alerted directly via DEAMS but the FEMA packet is submitted separately to FEMA by the 
RA as FEMA notification is necessary. During the DSCA event the unit has no reporting 
requirement to the SCC or SAFFM as each has DEAMS access and can view the RBA rate 
of execution, if any. Once the unit receives reimbursement from FEMA it alerts its SCC. 
The SCC in turn alerts SAFFM who will then close the DRAD (K. Jackey, personal 
communication, March 4, 2019). 
D. HURRICANE HARVEY DATA 
Examining data from a past DSCA event can aid in understanding what issues exist 
with the transitions from MA to DRAD to reimbursement, and ultimately to MA closeout. 
Through metrics derived both directly from DDASS and calculated from available DDASS 
data, Hurricane Harvey is used as an illustrative example of existing issues. 
1. Mission Assignment Manager 
The Mission Assignment Manager in DDASS is designed for Defense Coordinating 
Officers (DCOs) and other parties to track the approval process of MAs. The MA Manager 
provides a snapshot view that can be filtered by incident, and displays a brief summary of 
information pertaining to each MA, or in the case of multiple Mission Assignment Task 
Orders (MATOs), each MATO. Much of the information is not wholly relevant to FM 
operations, but the far-right color-coded column, entitled “FUND” displays a percentage 
of funds used; this percentage is calculated by dividing the estimated expenses under the 
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MA/MATO by the total Obligation Authority (OA) provided by the original MA and 
subsequent amendments. 
2. Reimbursable Manager 
The Reimbursable Manager in DDASS is designed for use by Service Comptrollers 
and FMAT members to view and update financial statuses for MAs. The view may be 
filtered by incident and contains information both about the MA and DRADS associated 
with MAs. If there are multiple DRADs per MA, each DRAD results in an additional line 
of data in the snapshot view. Unlike the MA Manager, the Reimbursable Manager does not 
identify MATO numbers. There is not a “stoplight” (red/yellow/green/) chart within the 
Reimbursable Manager view to quickly identify which MAs and/or DRADS are open or 
closed. At the bottom of the view, a summary of total Reimbursable Authority from FEMA 
is shown, along with the total Reimbursable Authority issued to DoD units (via DRADS), 
and the overall Reimbursable Authority not yet issued to DoD units. This summary is 
shown for the filtered data that the user has selected. 
3. MA / Reimbursable Editor 
From either the MA or Reimbursable Managers, a DDASS user can open a detailed 
editor for each MA. The viewing options are identical from both managers though varying 
permissions permit different editing rights for individuals. It is within this editor that 
updates are made to the tracking data shown on the main manager screens. The SU/RFA, 
EM and DR tabs are the financial tabs within the editor, with other tabs used for DCO/E 
coordination. It is important to note that the “actual expenditure” shown includes costs on 
open DRADs, which means that expenditures have not been finalized; open DRADS 
represent reimbursable authority that may or may not have expenditures tied to it. DRAD 
details, including issuer, recipient, and recipient point of contact, are found in these tabs. 
4. DDASS Reports 
a. MA Manager Excel Output 
A DDASS user can generate a Microsoft Excel report from the MA Manager view. 
This report includes most of the information from the MA Manager screen, but omits the 
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“stoplight” portion of the screen. The report does provide financial data that does not show 
up on the MA Manager screen, including Obligation Authority (OA) and estimated 
expenditures for each MA and MATO. However, the OA shown is only the initial amount 
provided for an MA, but does not include subsequent amendments. Thus, the estimated 
expenditures shown on the report may exceed the OA shown for a particular MA or MATO. 
While this is not immediately apparent, there is a listing of amendments provided in the 
report. The report is presented in standard spreadsheet format which allows for easy sorting 
and filtering. However, with financial data limited to that discussed above, the MA 
Manager report is of limited utility to Financial Managers. 
b. Reimbursable Manager Excel Output 
The Reimbursable Manager also produces a Microsoft Excel report. Unlike the MA 
Manager report, the Reimbursable Manager report completely re-arranges the data in a 
format not conducive to filtering and sorting. The report shows data for each DRAD and 
the overall MA, including cost and closeout information. However, MATO numbers are 
not referenced in the report. 
5. DATA Limitations within DDASS 
A comparison of the MA Manager and Reimbursable Manager reports brings up 
data discrepancies which could hinder effective financial management operations. First, 
the “estimated expenditure” value shown on the MA Manager report does not always match 
the actual expenditures shown on the Reimbursable Manager report or view screen. This 
can be seen in Hurricane Harvey DRAD 4332DR-TX-DOD-02-57-02, under MA 4332DR-
TX-DOD-02, where estimated expenditures in the MA manager show $459,382.80, but the 
Reimbursable Manager shows actual expenditure of $449,382.80. For Hurricane Harvey, 
it appears that this is the only discrepancy; DDASS does not allow the user to drill down 
and determine the source of the discrepancy. Second, the number of MAs shown in the 
different manager screens is not always the same. For Hurricane Harvey, the MA Manager 
screen and report display five more MAs than the Reimbursable Manager. While 
infrequent, the presence of one discrepancy may indicate the presence of others. 
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A limitation of the system appears to be Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) funding; 
while there are five MAs issued to DLA, one with estimated expenditures per the MA 
Manager, there is no record of tasking, RBA issuance or actual expenditures in the 
Reimbursable Manager or Editor functions of DDASS. On the MA screen, portions of the 
stoplight chart are blacked out for the DLA MAs. While this occurs with other, non-DLA 
MAs, coordination records within the Editor screen show that these were canceled; the 
DLA MAs show no such records. With MAs issued directly to DLA, it appears that the 
ordinary FMAT and DCO/E members that complete the DDASS process do not work on 
DLA-tasked MAs. 
Determining the final cost of an event via DDASS data is also a limitation, though 
not wholly of the system itself. Data pulled from the Reimbursable Manager includes open 
MAs and DRADS; until these are closed, costs should not be considered final. A cursory 
review of prior fiscal years from 2008 through 2018 indicates that open MAs exist for all 
fiscal years, though not necessarily all incidents. Were all MAs closed and all financial 
data input correctly into DDASS, cost reporting would be possible; however, this is not 
currently the case. 
6. Hurricane Harvey Metrics 
Various metrics can be extrapolated from DDASS Reimbursable Manager data. 
The following metrics were generated by re-arranging data pulled from the Reimbursable 
Manager Report and then performing basic calculations upon that data to create metrics.  
a. Issued Reimbursable Authority (RA) to Total RA Ratio 
A wholistic metric that can be easily derived is the ratio of issued RA to total RA. 
This is found by totaling the issued DRADs and the total RA behind each MA. These 
numbers are also found as a summary at the bottom of the Reimbursable Manager screen. 
Another useful comparison is looking at overall annual figures. Table 1, shows Hurricane 
Harvey’s data with annual data from 2008 through 2018. Note that this data excludes 
foreign disaster relief that appeared in DDASS. As can be seen, the ratio of issued to total 
RA for Hurricane Harvey is small in relation to annual figures. However, this number, 
though convenient to calculate and brief, does not convey significant meaning, as it 
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essentially serves as a ratio of detailed cost estimate figures to Rough Order of Magnitude 
(ROM) cost estimate figures. This is because of the process; the overall RA, based on MA 
dollar amounts, is generated through ROM estimates worked by FEMA and DCO/E staff 
in a short timeframe. DRAD issuance is based on detailed estimates by executing service 
components, and serves as the basis for the amount of RA actually issued. The actual 
expense is the most accurate figure, and DRADs are ultimately adjusted to match the actual 
expense once work is complete. A large disparity between these figures is to be expected. 
The larger the incident, the less time available for DCO/E staff to estimate, and the larger 
the error margin on the ROM estimate. In an emergency environment where the RA issuing 
authority (FEMA) is more concerned with response time than cost, it is better to 
overestimate than to underestimate when issuing an MA. Table 1 is thus of little utility in 
evaluating the effectiveness, or facilitating the completion, of financial management 
operations. It should be noted that no governing document studied describes the differences 
in estimating or anticipates discrepancies in dollar amounts, but the nature of the DSCA 
RA authorization process drives the differences. 




Total RA RA Issued
RA Funds Issued 
as Percentage of 
Total RA
Harvey $165,331,055 $11,570,750 7.0%
2008 $237,357,544 $11,601 0.0%
2009 $15,720,716 $0 0.0%
2010 $67,668,847 $0 0.0%
2011 $21,417,133 $1,423,288 6.6%
2012 $87,103,619 $24,294,155 27.9%
2013 $815,920 $66,606 8.2%
2014 $296,991 $6,393 2.2%
2015 $179,717 $21,900 12.2%
2016 $2,249,989 $282,145 12.5%
2017 $857,349,987 $210,857,871 24.6%
2018 $171,430,260 $6,642,895 3.9%
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b. MA Figures from DDASS 
From the Reimbursable Manager report, one can derive several metrics pertaining 
to MAs. Starting with a simple count, the number of open and closed MAs compared to 
the total number of MAs for an event may be calculated. For Hurricane Harvey, we can 
see that, by count, 24 of 35 total MAs, or 68.4%, in the Reimbursable Manager view are 
still open, with the remainder closed. This provides a basic idea of how the financial closure 
process is functioning. However, this simple metric does not help explain why the MAs 
remain open. We can gain additional insight into the “why?” question by looking at MAs 
for which no DRAD was issued; that is to say that FEMA provided RA to the DoD, but no 
subsequent allocation of that RA was made to a specific unit. Of all MAs, 16 had no 
DRADs issued. Of these, five have been closed; 11 remain open. Assuming that a lack of 
DRAD issuance means that no funds were needed (no mission execution occurred), closure 
should be feasible by validating that no work was performed by the DoD. We next look to 
MAs that are open, but all DRADs attached to the MA have been closed. This constitutes 
five in number, or 14.3% of all Hurricane Harvey MAs. These should be simple closures 
as the allocated DRADs have been closed. 
Also note that the same data can be calculated using the fund amounts attached to 
the MAs and this calculation is shown in Table 2 alongside the counted figures. 
Table 2. MA Data for Hurricane Harvey. Adapted from DDASS (n.d.). 
 
 
7. Organizational Breakdown of DDASS Data 
It is also useful to break down DDASS data by organization - in this case, by 
Agency, Combatant Command, or Service Component. Because each organization has a 






 Cost Percentage 
of total RA
Open MA (all MA) 24 68.6% 164,941,112.00$ 99.8%
Closed MA (All MA) 11 31.4% 389,942.59$        0.2%
Total MA Numbers 35 100.0% $165,331,054.59 100.0%
MA with no DRAD Issued 16 45.7% 143,596,375.00$ 86.9%
Open MA with no DRAD Issued 11 31.4% 143,596,375.00$ 86.9%
Closed MA with no DRAD Issued 5 14.3% -$                      0.0%
MA open where all DRAD closed 5 14.3% 3,587,703.00$     2.2%
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different method of allocating, tracking, and resolving RA issued to them, insight may be 
gained by looking at the organizations separately. Since the individual organizations are 
responsible for tracking and closing DRADs, the data is broken down by DRAD instead of 
by MA and is shown in Table 3. Of note, the Marine Corps is the only organization to close 
all issued DRADs, and DLA shows no issued DRADs against their MAs. DLA’s MAs 
together account for nearly $143.5M, significantly skewing the funded amount metrics 
reviewed in Table 2 as these five MA funds comprise the vast majority of all open MAs. 
To complicate matters further, some DRADs are only one of multiple under an MA; if one 
DRAD is open but the others closed, the MA cannot be closed. 
Just as looking at MA data alone does not fully depict the status of Financial 
Management operations, neither does looking only at DRAD data. 
Table 3. DRAD Data by Organization. Adapted from DDASS (n.d.). 
 
 
DRAD Data by Recepient of D-RAD
DRAD Closure 












Army Open 8 47.1% 3,510,953.61$     81.4%
Army Closed 9 52.9% 801,754.67$        18.6%
Army Total 17 100.0% 4,312,708.28$     100.0%
Navy Open 1 20.0% 2,030.64$             0.1%
Navy Closed 4 80.0% 3,610,520.74$     99.9%
Navy Total 5 100.0% 3,612,551.38$     100.0%
Air Force Open 4 57.1% 851,926.69$        65.7%
Air Force Closed 3 42.9% 444,722.48$        34.3%
Air Force Total 7 100.0% 1,296,649.17$     100.0%
Marine Corps Open 0 0.0% -$                      0.0%
Marine Corps Closed 3 100.0% 259,221.26$        100.0%
Marine Corps Total 3 100.0% 259,221.26$        100.0%
TRANSCOM Open 2 66.7% 82,000.00$          4.0%
TRANSCOM Closed 1 33.3% 1,977,073.00$     96.0%
TRANSCOM Total 3 100.0% 2,059,073.00$     100.0%
DLA Open 0 0.0% -$                      0.0%
DLA Closed 0 0.0% -$                      0.0%
DLA Total 0 0.0% -$                      0.0%
NORTHCOM Open 1 33.3% 58.50$                  0.2%
NORTHCOM Closed 2 66.7% 30,488.54$          99.8%
NORTHCOM Total 3 100.0% 30,547.04$          100.0%
All Organizations Open 16 42.1% 4,446,969.44$     38.4%
All Organizations Closed 22 57.9% 7,123,780.69$     61.6%
All Organizations Total 38 100.0% 11,570,750.13$   100.0%
DLA has 5 open MAs 
with no DRAD issued, 
totaling $142,506,375
Note: total does not 
include closure where 
no DRAD  issued
45 
a. Removing DLA Data 
Because DLA accounts for such a large proportion of un-issued RA, and the 
aforementioned DDASS limitations prevent an in-depth examination of DLA D-RADs or 
other coordinating documents, it is useful to analyze the overall MA data presented without 
the DLA MA data. DRAD data remains unchanged as there are no DRADs issued for DLA 
MAs. This data is shown in Table 4. Outside of DLA, the number of open MAs drops by 
five, and the dollar amount drops by $142.5M. Still, 63.3% of non-DLA MAs remain open. 
Going back to the DRAD data, however, shows that only $4.46M in issued DRADS are 
open, while there are $22.4M in open MAs. This suggests that the large dollar amount in 
open MAs is likely due to the expected delta between the ROM estimate used for MAs and 
the detailed estimates used by tasked units, along with the inevitable situation where an 
MA is issued but the requirement is cancelled and no funds are expended. 
Table 4. MA Data Excluding DLA Mas. Adapted from DDASS (n.d.). 
 
 
8. MA Tracker Spreadsheet 
This tracker, maintained by USNORTHCOM J83 as previously described, contains 
information pertinent to the financial management operations associated with MAs.  
During Hurricane Harvey, an early version of this tracker was used; this early 
version contains fewer data elements than the tracker used today, though it includes text 
from the MA and costs per MA listed as original and following amendment amounts. In 
this format, it can be seen where amendments were made to increase and close out MAs. 
Dated February 2018, it indicates a total cost of $122,535,228.98, which does not 
correspond with DDASS information. Of particular note, there are comments on the 







 Cost Percentage 
of total RA
Open MA (all MA) 19 63.3% 22,434,737.00$   98.3%
Closed MA (All MA) 11 36.7% 389,942.59$        1.7%
Total MA Numbers 30 100.0% $22,824,679.59 100.0%
MA with no D-RAD Issued 11 36.7% 1,090,000.00$     4.8%
Open MA with no DRAD Issued 6 20.0% 1,090,000.00$     4.8%
Closed MA with no DRAD Issued 5 16.7% -$                      0.0%
MA open where all DRAD closed 5 16.7% 3,587,703.00$     15.7%
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spreadsheet indicating discrepancies with a FEMA tracking spreadsheet and with DDASS 
data. The spreadsheet also contains MAs that no longer exist in DDASS. 
The new MA tracker was not used for Hurricane Harvey, but notes within a 
spreadsheet for recent events shows that discrepancies within DDASS are known; the MA 
tracker provides additional clarity for FMAT members that DDASS cannot. Notes in the 
MA Tracker indicate tasks switching from one MA to another, MAs generated to track 
existing DRADs, and changes between SU/EM/DR MA types for the same requested 
support function. Within DDASS, there is no single report that provides these data 
elements. 
E. OBSERVATIONS AND CHALLENGES 
This section reflects on the data and what areas create challenges within the process 
in an effort to select the most glaring concerns. The purpose is not to identify every concern 
point but rather highlight the areas that if improved, could yield the most benefit. 
1. MA Continuity 
At the beginning of the authorization process, an MA that begins as a surge (SU) 
MA can switch to a major disaster (DR) MA after declared by the president. A scenario 
that often occurs is that a unit will receive RBA and will go forth in executing those 
requirements all citing the initial SU MA. At the time when the president declares a major 
disaster, the source document for a mission in progress changes to a DR MA. The proper 
documentation once a DR MA is created would be to grant RBA again to those units 
executing the mission so that their period of performance is extended as provided by the 
presidential declaration. Note that the SU MA only provides a short period of RBA while 
the DR MA provides a much longer period of funding. 
This creates challenges in tracking the proper MAs at the unit, SCC, and 
USNORTHCOM levels. For many units conducting operations during hurricane events, 
their source document can switch from the SU MA to the DR MA without their knowledge 
and while their mission is underway. Many unit level financial managers and FEUs do not 
have the level of familiarization necessary to navigate this challenge. If a unit begins their 
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mission under the source document of a SU MA then switches to a DR MA, it is unclear 
how the unit should expect to be reimbursed by a prorated amount associated with each 
source document. 
2. Manual Entry and Cross Referencing 
The entire processes for both the authorization and reimbursement are full of 
manual entries. DDASS, the MA Tracker, and the Annex A all contain manually entered 
data. These databases contain many pieces of redundant information but the specialized 
information that is utilized by each author is necessary to track the process appropriately. 
The challenge with having several partially overlapping databases is the need for 
continuous cross-referencing. If inconsistencies arise between the MA tracker and DDASS 
after USNORTHCOM has granted approval for RBA to the SCC, but before the SCC has 
issued the RBA to the unit and has made the update in DDASS, manual review is the only 
method to identify the inconsistency. No alert exists that pairs DDASS and the MA tracker 
to easily identify discrepancies. This process is tedious and demands the inefficient use of 
labor at the SCC and USNORTHCOM levels to continually cross-reference manually 
entered databases. 
SCC’s have little ability to verify correct payment from FEMA to a unit. At the last 
stage of the process, when the SCC is trying to determine what units have been reimbursed, 
another cross-reference takes place between the MA tracker and a document provided by 
FEMA. This document contains the liquidated and unliquidated obligations associated with 
a given MA. The SCC takes this document and compares it with their records as shown in 
DDASS to determine which units have been paid. The only piece of continuity between 
the unliquidated obligations document and DDASS is the amount claimed. If this number 
does not match, the SCC has no idea if FEMA paid the unit a different amount or if a 
payment was made at all (K. Devlin, personal communication, January 29, 2019). 
3. SCC Unit Execution Awareness 
From the vantage point of the SCC, determining what units have executed 
reimbursable expenditures can be difficult to assess. A sometimes-false assumption is to 
believe that all units who have received RBA must have executed some type of expenditure 
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that is reimbursable. Talking points discussed during the VISTA CAPITAL exercise 
address this assumption. The example that was given was the case of a search and rescue 
MA where RBA had been granted to a unit to conduct search and rescue operations if 
necessary. When the necessity for such operations did not arise, the situation left a RBA 
document outstanding with no claims against it since no SAR operations were conducted 
(USNORTHCOM J7, 2018). This makes it difficult for the SCCs to determine what other 
units actually conducted operations if no reimbursement claims are made against an RBA 
document. The importance of this point is to understand that the SCC cannot make the 
assumption that all RBAs will result in claims, therefore the due diligence and tedious 
cross-referencing necessary are identified as a challenge point in this study. 
The process requires units and FEUs to make contact with the SCC in order to 
request RBA and execute a claim. The contact information for the SCC is provided in the 
orders but the multitude of unit/FEU financial management POCs are not readily available 
to the SCC. This is a single point of failure that relies on the unit/FEU’s FM personnel to 
comply exactly to the contact instructions found in the orders. If this does not occur, the 
RBA will not be issued and if a unit expends funds it will be via DBA on a non-
reimbursable basis. Additionally, if that initial contact is not made, the SCC has no single 
point of reference to determine if a unit did expend funds associated with an outstanding 
MA. The close and continued contact between the unit/FEUs and the SCC is a challenge 
area that if improved, could greatly improve in the accuracy of the final cost capturing. 
4. Service Specific Instructions and Training 
While the FMR and many DoD publications cover the topic of DSCA, only the 
FMAT manual covers the process in enough detail for the SCCs to understand the details 
of their role in the process. Although the FMAT manual provides guidance to the SCCs, 
this study was unable to find FM service specific policy for DSCA reimbursement that 
could be used by the unit level. The process from the SCC down relies on SCC POC 
dissemination via the orders process that will then provide instructions to the units once 
that contact is made. The instructions to the units are in some case via email guidance that 
is only disseminated to those units who make initial contact (K. Devlin, personal 
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communication, January 29, 2019). There is no document that is disseminated service wide 
to unit/FEU FM personnel that provides specific instructions for that service on the specific 
FM steps of the DSCA reimbursement process. 
This observation falls closely in line with many recommendations received during 
our interviews. The comments regarding how might the process be improved often yielded 
the topic of training at the unit level (K. Devlin, personal communication, January 29, 
2019; W. Maurer, email to author, January 16, 2019). Yet the study observed the absence 
of documents that could provide service specific training to each unit. Unit/FEU 
familiarization with the process is imperative and is viewed to be an area that could be 
greatly improved. The current base knowledge at this level is believed to be low. It can be 
speculated that this is a result of turnover, infrequent DSCA events, and a lack of service 
specific guidance geared to the unit/FEU level of understanding. 
5. Expectation Management 
From various interviews and the Vista Capital exercise, it was apparent that 
expectation mismatch occurs between different entities involved with the DSCA 
reimbursement process. At the highest level is an assumption that OUSD (C) will issue 
Special Purpose Codes (SPCs) for each DSCA event, and personnel from the service 
component level and below wait for such codes, noting that cost reporting guidance is 
typically days to weeks after the first MAs are issued (USNORTHCOM J7, 2018). 
However, at the OUSD (C) level, SPC guidance will only be issued if OSD desires tracking 
costs for a particular event. In the absence of OSD interest, OUSD (C) will not issue SPCs 
(Barbara Buteau-Pierre, 2019), but this does not prohibit nor prevent service components 
from implementing their service-specific tracking mechanisms. For non-SPC guidance, the 
FMR and standing instructions, manuals, and directives provide the necessary guidance for 
service components to execute DSCA reimbursable funding. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents recommendations and a summary of finding from the study, 
along with suggestions for future research. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are provided to address several challenges 
identified in Chapter V. 
1. Service Specific Desk Manuals for Units/FEUs 
This study recommends the creation of service-specific desk manuals geared 
toward users at the unit and FEU level to define a standard process and improve unit 
understanding of their role. This area exhibits institutional weakness within the services. 
The pieces of this process that create the largest challenge is the final interaction between 
the unit/FEUs and the SCCs. Some units understand their role and their required interaction 
with their respective SCCs but those units are believed to be the minority. The best way to 
get the greatest amount of understanding disseminated among those units who are lacking 
would be to create a desk manual that could be referenced by each unit. Each respective 
manual would seek to achieve: 
a. MA Continuity 
As previously described in Chapter V, MA continuity creates problems by creating 
source document changes during the execution process. These issues can be overcome 
provided every organization within the process understands and expects those document 
changes. The desk manual could describe the general reasons for the changes, how to 
anticipate those changes while providing instructions how to reference the proper MA 
during a claim. 
b. SCC Unit Execution Awareness 
While the desk manual would not immediately solve all of the challenges associated 
with the SCC’s understanding of which units are performing what actions, the manual 
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would improve the communication lines between the SCC and the unit/FEUs thereby 
increasing the overall execution awareness. It would also spell out the mechanism 
established to track unit execution in the future. 
c. Key Performance Expectations 
Since DSCA related events occur infrequently, many unit financial managers are 
unaware of what is required of them. A desk manual would spell out these requirements 
greatly aiding the SCCs in the performance of their oversight. Absent a desk manual, a unit 
financial manager would be required to wade through numerous high-level documents that 
do not provide the expectations clearly at their level. It would remove the necessity of 
expert specific and experience driven knowledge by replacing it with service policy. 
d. Training 
The desk manual would provide source material if FM specific DSCA training 
requirements were established in the future assuming training does not currently exist. If 
training at the unit/FEU level is currently conducted before events take place, it would 
provide a consolidation of topics appropriates for that audience. 
Just as the FMAT manual provided clarity in the relationships at the higher echelons 
of this process, so too could service specific manuals that more clearly define protocol at 
the SCC to unit level. Further comments are made at the end of this chapter related to NPS 
future research associated with this recommendation. 
2. Expectation Management 
The recommendation to the SCCs is to lean forward and assign SPCs in the absence 
of direction from OUSD (C). The recommendation to OUSD (C) is to clearly state whether 
or not a DoD-wide SPC will be issued, ideally at the time of the initial DoD request. This 
would prevent confusion at the onset of a DSCA response. 
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3. Metrics that Matter 
The recommendation is to stop using the metric comparing reimbursement 
requested to total RBA issued and replace it with metrics that more accurately gauge 
reimbursement process effectiveness: 
• Total MAs closed (simple count) as compared to the total number of MAs 
issued. This metric comes with the caveat that an MA with multiple 
DRADs might be open because of one, or multiple DRADs. 
• The total number of open DRADs as compared to the total number of 
DRADs issued. It is important to compare the simple count of open 
DRADs in addition to the dollar amounts as a single large DRAD could 
skew a dollar-based metric. 
• The total reimbursement (in dollars) as compared to the total amount 
issued in DRADs. This figure compares reimbursement to the amount of 
RBA actually issued by SCCs to operational units, which is based on more 
detailed estimates than those prepared for MA issuance. 
• DRAD metrics (both in dollar terms and simple count) by service. It is key 
to note that the services are responsible for submitting reimbursement 
claims and closing DRADS, not USNORTHCOM. This metric provides a 
method for evaluating the progress of each responsible service towards 
obtaining reimbursements. 
4. Unclear Guidance 
Recommend clarifying language to the DoD FMR Vol 11A, Chapter 19, and to JP 
3–28 to provide a definition of incremental costs, ideally with examples that depict a 
situation where a unit had already planned flight hours during the DSCA response. 
Additionally, recommend adding a note to paragraph 2.c.(13) of DoDI 3025.23, 




To summarize the results of this analysis, the original research questions are 
presented with the results found during the study. 
1. Question 1 
If the DoD is not executing the full reimbursable authority granted by FEMA for 
the services rendered and is instead using authority from the DoD budget, what are the 
factors leading to, and consequences of, not doing so and can this be calculated? 
The major factor identified in possible discrepancies between actual costs incurred 
and reimbursement requested are a lack of process knowledge at the FEU/unit level. As 
noted in the analysis and recommendations sections, the complexity of the reimbursement 
process was a recurring theme throughout discussions with process participants. DDASS 
data, when MAs are closed out, can be used to calculate the noted delta. However, the 
database does not provide enough data to identify if units are using their DoD 
appropriations and failing to request reimbursement, in part or full. 
2. Question 2 
If there are instances where DoD has requested more than authorized, what are the 
factors that create such a situation? 
This study did not uncover any instances where the DoD requested more than what 
was authorized; instead, it appears that the mechanisms to request additional RBA from 
FEMA function properly as many MAs showed amendments increasing the authorization 
after initial issuance. Because of the flow of cost estimation (ROM first, then detailed), it 
is more likely for a unit to have excess authority from FEMA rather than too little. 
3. Question 3 
What does the difference between the FEMA authorized reimbursement amount 
and the amount actually claimed represent? 
As noted in the analysis and recommendations sections regarding metrics, the large 
difference between the FEMA authorized amount and the reimbursement claimed is 
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essentially a meaningless figure. To better understand the limitations of DoD cost 
estimating, it would instead be necessary to examine differences between issued DRADs 
and reimbursements. This would provide insight into the accuracy of the unit-level cost 
estimation done in support of DSCA work. 
4. Question 4 
If the amount requested is less than what should be reimbursed, can the shortfall be 
calculated during one specific hurricane event? 
This study was not sufficient in scope to quantify the shortfall (if any) between 
reimbursement and actual costs incurred. To determine this figure would require 
examination of unit-level execution records alongside FEMA reimbursement requests - 
information that is not easily obtainable. For future studies, a limited-scope effort focusing 
on a sample of units for a particular incident could be performed. 
5. Question 5 
If the amount requested is less than what is should be claimed, how might the 
process be improved? 
As previously discussed, the results of this research has not been able to determine 
a dollar value delta between what is and what should be claimed. Based upon feedback 
during our interviews, there is reason to believe that not all expenditures are being 
reimbursed. As previously stated, we believe the greatest current weakness to be present in 
level of knowledge at the unit/FEU echelon. This process could be greatly improved if all 
policy and process guidance was consolidated in one service specific desk manual for the 
intended audience at the unit/FEU level. This would provide a training template and would 
establish communication expectations for the unit/FEUs in their coordination with the 
SCCs. 
Limitations:  This recommended solution does not put in place any training 
requirements within the services and it does not provide any improvement to the issues 
created by the numerous manual entries throughout the process.  
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6. Question 6 
Do the unit level financial managers understand the reimbursement process and 
their role within the process? 
Although the research team was not able to contact all potential unit level 
participants, we are able to conclude through our interviews that the level of knowledge 
presumably varies across the unit FM personnel. In one case we conducted an interview 
with a unit financial manager with a high level of knowledge regarding the required 
documentation and communication with their respective SCC. This POC was provided by 
the SCC as an example of an exceptional professional who was familiar with the process. 
Yet, the SCC also established that this was an exception to the norm alluding to the belief 
that many of the unit financial managers do not possess this high level of familiarization.  
Limitations:  Our results are based off of our qualitative analysis through interviews 
with stakeholders. We were not able to interview all personnel involved with the process 
so our results are based on a sampling. Sampling will always yield the possibility of error, 
but for the sake of this study, we take the sample analysis to reflect insight into the entire 
stakeholder population. 
7. Question 7 
How does the non-routine nature of the DSCA funding and reimbursement process 
contribute to issues with reimbursement rates and timelines? 
The non-routine nature of the DSCA processes are believed to primarily impact the 
level of knowledge at the unit financial management levels. Since NORTHCOM and the 
SCCs often work in DSCA environments, the stakeholders we interviewed at this level 
were very familiar with the correct process. In the cases of more centralized FM structures 
such as the Navy, many FEUs are familiar with this process because they fund more than 
just one command and therefore this process is more routine since there is a greater chance 
of involvement. In the case of the decentralized services, the non-routine nature of these 
events lends greatly to their lack of knowledge regarding the proper process. When these 
non-routine events do occur, it only reinforces the finding that there is no one stop reference 
that provides guidance for their financial actions. Service specific desk manuals would 
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remove the requirement for experience based knowledge while centralizing the information 
necessary for unit financial managers to do their jobs despite the events being non-routine. 
Limitations: This question was deduced from the broad understanding gained by 
the research team thus far and does not rely on direct comment from any of the 
interviewees. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations for future research are intended to advance this 
study to a point where improvement can be implemented within the DSCA reimbursement 
process. 
1. Expanded Service Specific Analysis 
Future research specifically mapping the process within the SCCs with greater 
detail would assist the services in detailing the process on paper, a necessary step in the 
implementation of service specific desk guides. A project could be conducted for each 
service producing a near complete reference for a unit/FEU during future DSCA events.  
2. USINDOPACOM 
As this study focused on USNORTHCOM, a separate study could focus on 
USINDOPACOM to better understand where areas of improvement exist and what similar 
challenges are faced among the combatant commanders. 
3. Reimbursement Gap 
Future studies only focusing on the reimbursement gap could help better quantify 
improvement over time. Such research requires extensive unit and FEMA reimbursement 
data. 
4. Disaster Relief Funding Reform 
As the current process relies solely on the processing of reimbursable claims, the 
frequency of DoD involvement in DSCA events begs the question as to whether or not the 
reimbursement process is the best method. A 2001 study titled “A Framework for 
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Analyzing Emergency Management with an Application to Federal Budgeting” pointed 
out that many states have “rainy day” funds for disaster relief. The paper presents the option 
that one solution to disaster funding could be a reserve fund that has a ceiling which is 
filled through congressional appropriations until that ceiling is reached. The reserve could 
be drawn upon during each disaster event, only to be filled again during the next 
congressional appropriation (Donahue & Joyce, 2001). Perhaps this option could be 
applied to the DoD—FEMA relationship. 
Future research efforts could focus on the concept of a reserve fund that could be 
created within DoD to provide immediate funding to DoD units when assigned to DSCA 
missions. This reserve fund could have a maximum ceiling to be replenished by FEMA 
when drawn upon. Direct cite expenditures referencing the reserve fund could be instructed 
in SCC specific guidance. The study could seek to answer the following questions: 
• Who would be the most appropriate agent of the fund? 
• How would the approval process have to be modified to authorize 
expenditures via direct cite during DSCA events?   
• What would be the duration of the funds if these funds would have to last 
longer than DoD appropriations if left unused? 
• Is it lawful for a fund with an indefinite duration to exist within the control 
of DoD comptrollers? 
• What would be the recommended reserve fund ceiling? 
• At what frequency would FEMA replenish the DoD fund. 
• How would the audit requirements change? 
If feasible, such reform could provide a higher degree of accounting accuracy for 
DSCA expenditures while successfully funding leaning forward costs incurred by the DoD 
before a disaster declaration.   
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5. Principal Agent Theory Applied Financial Management in Disaster 
Relief.  
Further study into the affect the principal agent theory may have on the financial 
management of disaster relief efforts at the federal level is required.  The fundamental 
premise of principal agent theory is that an actor (principal) calls upon another entity 
(agent) to complete some action on behalf of the principal.  Generally, there are incentives 
for the agent to complete the action as desired by the principal, and at times the agent may 
be difficult to control or work as the principal desires.  This theory applied to the public 
realm of government makes it only that much more intricate.  With each layer of 
bureaucracy further iterations of this theory are born culminating in a multi layered, 
complex fabric affecting the DSCA reimbursement process.  
Further study into principal agent theory and DSCA reimbursement may attempt to 
answer the following questions:  
• Does FEMA act as principal since it grants the reimbursable authority?  
• Is USNORTHCOM the only agent in the process?  
• Do the units of action act as agents of their own service or 
USNORTHCOM/FEMA?  
• Does the fact that FEMA’s funds have no expiration date contribute to the 
poor rate of claims against this reimbursable authority?  
Answering these questions may provide further insight into the difficulty of the 
financial management of DSCA events and the necessity for a clearly defined homogenous 
reimbursement process.  
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